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INTRODUCTION

This Article examines the policies and practices of the European
Commission toward various forms of bilateral regulatory cooperation with
administrative agencies of the United States. To place this Article's
findings in a proper perspective, it is essential to understand both (A) the
selection of the European Community (E.C.) as an appropriate overseas
regulatory jurisdiction for such cooperation and (B) the reasons for focusing
on the European Commission among the various E.C. institutions. Those
questions are taken up in this Introduction. Part I describes in some detail
the organization and functioning of the Commission. Part II-the core of
this Article-analyzes the Commission's practices and policies on
regulatory cooperation with U.S. agencies at all levels. Finally, Part III
offers some general conclusions that may be drawn from this inquiry.
A.

The European Community as U.S. Regulatory Counterpart

The European Community is, at the present time, the clearest candidate
for partnership with the U.S. in a collaborative rulemaking process. The
E.C's political institutions enjoy substantial responsibility for making
regulatory policy in a market that is of roughly the same size and economic
importance as the U.S., that enjoys about the same level of economic
development and standard of living as the U.S., and that is America's
single most significant trade partner.' Because European industry is at the
same time American industry's single most important business competitor,
regulatory policy in the U.S. and E.C. is a major determinant of those
industries' basic competitiveness.

1. Former E.C. Commissioner Christiane Scrivener, in a speech to the American
International Club of Geneva, recently described the U.S. and E.C. as having "the most
important interdependent relationship in the world" and as being "each other's largest single
trading partner." Commission of the European Communities, RAPID, Apr. 29, 1994
(LEXIS, EURCOM Library, Rapid File). In 1993, the Commission placed bilateral trade
in goods between the U.S. and E.C. at 200 billion U.S. dollars for the year and two-way
investment at around 420 billion U.S. dollars. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 27TH GENERAL REPORT 255 (1993) (1994).
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Historically, much E.C. regulation has been predicated on the desirability
of establishing a more fully harmonized regulatory environment, so that the
factors of production-goods, persons, services and capital-may enjoy
greater freedom of movement, resulting in a more fully integrated economic
market. The term "internal market" refers to such an area.2 More
recently, Member State leaders have enlarged the E.C.'s subject matter
competence, so that policy in many sectors may be made at the E.C. level
without express reference to its contribution to market integration. Newer
regulatory competences, such as environmental policy, consumer protection,
and worker safety and health, have been added to the few regulatory
spheres that were specifically set out in the original treaties as belonging to
the Community. Notable among the original regulatory spheres are
competition law, agricultural policy and commercial policy. In these areas,
the E.C. enjoys what may be called "autonomous" regulatory authority
("autonomous" in this context meaning without regard to market integration), as limited and defined in the Treaty of Rome.' However, whether
it is based on the Community's authority to legislate in the interest of the
common market, on the one hand, or on the Community's "autonomous"
regulatory authority, on the other, the legislation produced in Brussels is as
fully regulatory as the rulemaking characteristic of U.S. administrative
agencies in Washington, D.C. Because, as noted, the E.C.'s stage of
economic and social development is roughly similar to that of the U.S., and
because their political and cultural values are broadly comparable, the
regulations adopted in the two capitals cover broadly the same range of
issues and, within that range of issues, often pursue the same general policy
ends.'
B.

The Role of the European Commission in Community Regulation

It is difficult to identify in the E.C. context the exact institutional
counterpart of the U.S. executive branch and independent agencies, i.e., the
agencies wielding national regulatory authority under the broad statutory
delegations that Congress typically makes under the Commerce Clause.
This is because regulatory authority at the E.C. level is shared by the

2. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, [hereinafter E.C. TREATY],
art. 7a.
3. Id. titles II, V, and VII (setting forth rules and policies on agriculture, competition,
and commercial policy, respectively).
4. The Commission itself has remarked on the "growing parallelism between the US
Administrations' priorities and policies, and those of the Community." COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMISSION PAPER ON E.C.-U.S. RELATIONS 4 (Apr. 6, 1993).
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Council (comprising representatives of the Member States) and the
Commission (the Community's chief executive body), with the European
Parliament (directly elected by the citizens of the European Union) playing
a role as well.
The Council has authority under the Treaty of Rome to adopt the most
important regulatory texts provided for in the Treaty, though it may in
principle do so only where based upon a prior formal Commission
proposal.5 In many instances the Council, in accordance with the Treaty,6
has delegated that authority to the Commission,7 and the Treaty occasionally confers regulatory authority directly on the Commission. 8 Furthermore,
in practice, and in many cases by law, the Council and Commission obtain
the advice of the European Parliament before adopting a regulatory text.
Amendments to the E.C. Treaty introduced by the Single European Act in
1987 granted to Parliament a more direct and active, though still limited,
legislative role in many important legislative areas.9 I refer mainly to what
has come to be known as the "parliamentary cooperation procedure."'"
Treaty amendments later adopted at Maastricht in 1992" granted to
Parliament an effective right of veto over legislation in certain areas. When

5. E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 153.
6. Id. arts. 145, 155.
7. See Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle ftir Getreide und Futtermittel v. K6ster, Berodt & Co.,
Case 25/70, [1970] ECR 1161.
8. See, e.g., E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, arts. 10(2) (administrative cooperation in
elimination of customs duties among Member States and setting up common customs tariff),
13 (abolition of charges having effect equivalent to customs duties between Member States),
22 (computation of common customs tariff), 33(7) (timetable for abolition of measures
having effect equivalent to quotas), 45(2) (approximation of agricultural prices), 48(3)(d)
(regulations on right of workers to remain in another Member State after employment), 90(3)
(rules governing public undertakings and undertakings enjoying special or exclusive rights),
91(2) (rules on duty-free and limit-free reimportation of goods from another Member State).
In addition to the regulatory authority conferred on it directly by the Treaty, the
Commission also has Treaty-based authority to issue individual decisions in important
categories of cases. See, e.g., E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, arts. 17(4) (authorization to
maintain customs duty), 25(l)(2) (finding of insufficient domestic production or other
groundsjustifying imports below common customstariff), 26 (authorization to Member State
to postpone application of common customs tariff), 37(3) (authorization to Member States
to apply protective measures).
9. SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT 1987 O.J. (L 169).
10. E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 189c.
11. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. G 1992 O.J. (C 191).
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enacting measures under this "parliamentary co-decision procedure,"' 2 the
Council, in effect, needs Parliament's express or tacit approval. 3
Despite the fact that regulatory authority is ultimately vested in the
Council and, in some cases, the Parliament, the focal point for any inquiry
into E.C. regulatory cooperation with the U.S. is decidedly the Commission.
This is because, under the E.C. legislative process, all regulatory measures-even those ultimately requiring adoption by the Council and
possibly approval by Parliament-must be based on prior formal proposals
of the Commission. Although the Council normally may not adopt such a
measure without a prior Commission proposal, the Council may seek to
modify the proposal before it is adopted. Because of its virtual monopoly
on legislative initiative, the Commission has a clear advantage in setting
E.C. regulatory priorities, in conceiving and studying the problems that
need addressing at the E.C. level, in formulating regulatory solutions, and
in proposing draft measures to that end. Even where the Commission lacks
authority under the Treaty or under Council legislation to enact these
measures on its own, the Commission itself in all likelihood will have
conceived and elaborated the measures and initially put them into proposal
form. In the case of E.C. agreements with third countries-a prospect of
obvious relevance to international regulatory cooperation-the Commission
has an even firmer treaty basis for the exercise of power; it has exclusive
authority to negotiate international agreements, though it is ultimately
subject to a negotiating mandate by the Council and subject to the
Council's decision whether or not to approve them. 4
In appreciating the predominance of the Commission in any discussion
of international regulatory cooperation by the E.C., it is also important to
remember that the Commission is a standing body of persons permanently
located in Brussels who, though named by the Member States themselves
"by common accord," are duty bound to act in the Community interest and
without instructions, formal or informal, from the Member State governments." The Council, by contrast, gathers in Brussels, or elsewhere, as
and when there is legislative business to conduct; such business will
typically be proposals from the Commission to be considered for adoption.
Even then, only the Member State ministers whose portfolios are affected
by the proposals will be the ones to assemble as the Council. In further

12. Parliamentary co-decision refers to the legislative procedure under which
parliamentary opposition prevents a measure from being enacted.
13. E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 189b.
14. Id. art. 228.
15. Id.arts. 157-58.
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contrast, the Commission is supported by a permanent staff (of around
12,000) consisting of technical, legal, and policy personnel (plus administrative support of various kinds) based in Brussels. While the Council itself
also has more or less permanent support of the same varieties, chiefly in the
form of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) of the
Member States, its support is by no means of the same magnitude.
Thus, it is not only the Commission's predominance in formulating
regulatory policy that accounts for its crucial role in international regulatory
cooperation, but also the Commission's permanence and visibility in
Brussels, reinforced by its larger staff. This means that the parties that are
most likely to press for international regulatory cooperation-U.S. and
other overseas regulators, as well as private economic interests seeking to
promote regulatory harmonization, 6 for example-will find the Commission and its various services a generally more accessible, receptive and
effective listener. Indeed, this activity might be regarded as a species of
the legislative lobbying activity of which the Commission is a frequent
target. 7 When the Council finally deliberates and votes, it does so in
utmost secrecy. It also frequently acts on the basis of purely political and
Member State-driven considerations, and in a spirit of political expedience
rather than "neutral" policy assessment. For all these reasons, any serious
consideration of international regulatory coordination in the making of
Community policy, as a practical matter, will have to be paid at the prior
policy-formulation stage, the stage at which the Commission is absolutely
predominant; otherwise it is not likely to be paid at all.
Despite this Article's focus on the Commission as the privileged E.C.
participant in international regulation cooperation, it is important to bear in
mind not only that much of that cooperation is subject to approval by the
Council and to influence (if not in all cases approval) by Parliament, but
also that the actual implementation of E.C. law, once it is made, remains
primarily in Member State hands. With the principal exceptions of
competition and state aid law, regulatory policy is carried out mostly by
Member State personnel, in much the same way as the Member States carry
out their own domestic policies. This is in contrast to U.S. administrative
practice, in which much federally-made policy is also federally-implemented. In devising forms of international regulatory cooperation with the E.C.,

16. The Commission estimates that about 3,000 organized interest groups, employing
10,000 people, are located in Brussels. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
INFORMATION-COMMUNICATION-OPENNESS 79 (1994).
17. See generally LOBBYING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 82-88 (Sonia Mazey &
Jeremy Richardson, eds., 1993).
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and notably with the Commission, U.S. agencies thus need to bear in mind
that Member State administrations bear primary responsibility for putting
Community policy into practice on a daily basis. It is true, of course, that
the Commission oversees the Member States' performance in implementing
directives and other Community law, and thus in a sense also participates
in its enforcement.'" The fact remains, however, that implementation is
primarily a Member State responsibility.
The E.C. is often dependent upon the Member States not only for the
implementation of Community law, but also for its very transposition into
national law. This is because a great deal of E.C. rulemaking takes the
legal form of directive rather than regulation. Unlike a regulation (which
legally binds the Member State administrations immediately and directly as
of its entry into force), a directive requires that the relevant Member State
legislators and regulators, by the deadline set out in the directive, make
whatever legislative and regulatory modifications to existing national law
are required to bring national law into conformity with the content of the
directive. 9 In other words, while E.C. regulations may require execution
by Member State authorities, E.C. directives require both transpositionand
execution by those authorities. A U.S. agency that engages in international
regulatory cooperation with the European Commission will therefore have
a special interest, in the event that the cooperation culminates in the
issuance of a directive, in exploring the extent to which that directive has
been implemented into national laws and regulations in a faithful and
timely fashion.
This Article's focus on the Commission is thus a reflection of that
institution's central role in the E.C. legislative process. As one authority
has written: "With an array of power resources and policy instruments at
its disposal-and strengthened by the frequent unwillingness or inability of
the Council to provide clear leadership--the Commission is at the very
heart of the Community system.""0 The Commission's yearly output of

18. Enforcement proceedings by the Commission against the Member States under
Article 169 of the E.C. Treaty is the usual vehicle for this purpose.
19. See E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 189 (regarding issuance of directive and
creation of regulations).
20.

NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

61 (2d ed. 1991). Nugent underscores the sense among senior Commission officials of "the
lack of political direction from above" and "the amount of room for policy initiation that
is available to them." Id. at 73.
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legal instruments is around 600 proposals for Community legislation, all
addressed to the Council, and in some cases also the Parliament."
I.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE POLICY PROPOSAL PROCESS

For the reasons set out in the Introduction, the European Commission is
the only E.C. institution that may realistically be expected to engage in
sustained international regulatory cooperation with U.S. agencies on behalf
of the E.C. Part I of this Article accordingly describes the Commission in
some detail from an institutional point of view, and then outlines the
process by which the Commission develops a regulatory idea and puts it
into the form of a definitive proposal for adoption by the Council as a
regulation or directive. It is during the course of this decisional process
that E.C. regulators have their greatest opportunity to pursue international
regulatory cooperation with U.S. and other overseas regulators.
A.

The Commission Structure

The Commission is the E.C.'s principal executive organ. Functioning as
a collegial body, the Commission consists at present of 20 members named
by common accord among the Member States. Under the Treaty, each
Member State has the right to one Commissioner22 and it is assumed that
the five largest Member States will each supply a second Commissioner.
The E.C. Treaty expressly requires, however, that Commissioners act in full
independence of their governments and receive no instructions from
them .3

Under modified Treaty rules adopted by the Member States at
Maastricht, and effective with the Commission term starting January 1995,
the Member State governments first nominate, by unanimity, a candidate
for president of the Commission. 24 Because the nominee and the rest of
the Commission will have to be approved by the European Parliament, the
Member States are expected to consult with Parliament about the nominee
at an early stage 5 In close consultation with the nominee, the Member

21. Id. It is estimated that the Commission produces an additional 200 or more
communications, memoranda and reports per year. The number of instruments that the
Commission definitively issues each year on the basis of its own decisional authority
(Commission directives, regulations and decisions) is much greater, in the vicinity of 5,000.
Id. at 78.
22. E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 157(1).
23. Id. art. 157(2).
24. Id. art. 158(2).
25. Id.
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State governments then proceed to nominate the other Commissioners.26
Although the presidential nominee does not have the right to name those
Commissioners, his or her views are apt to be given serious consideration
by the Member States.
Once the nominees have been designated, their names are submitted as
a body for approval by the Parliament for renewable five-year terms, coterminus with the Parliament's own term of office.27 The Parliament must
express its approval or disapproval of the Commission as a whole, and no
Commissioner may assume office until Parliament has approved the body
as a whole.2" Once so approved, the new Commission is formally
appointed by the Member States.29 The Commission remains formally
responsible to the Parliament in that the latter may force the Commission's
collective resignation at any time by passing a vote of censure by a twothirds majority of votes cast, representing at least a majority of MEP's."
To date, no motion of censure has passed.
The Commission as a whole, guided by the President, determines the
allocation of responsibilities among the Commissioners. 3 Each Commissioner will thus receive one or more "portfolios."32 Notwithstanding this
specialization of Commissioners, no proposal may be adopted and sent in
the Commission's name to the Council for enactment, unless approved by
a majority of the full Commission.33
Contrary to what one might suppose, the Commission's permanent staff
is not organized by portfolio. Rather, the staff is arranged into twenty-four
more or less permanent Directorates-General, designated by subject matter,
and each headed by a Director-General.34 However, the DirectoratesGeneral are assigned to the Commissioner to whose portfolio their subject
matters most closely correspond.35 The Commission may also set up

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 158(1).
Id. art. 158(2).
Id. art. 158(3).
Id. art. 144.
31. COMMISSION R. OF PROC. art. 12, 1993 O.J. (L 230/17).
32. David Spence, Structure, Functionsand Proceduresin the Commission, in THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 97-99 (G. Edwards & D. Spence, eds., 1994).
33. E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 163 (stating that Commission "shall act by a
majority of the number of members ....
).
34. COMMISSION R. OF PROC., supra note 31, arts. 17, 18; Spence, supra note 32, at
97, 100-101.
35. COMMISSION R. OF PROC., supra note 31, art. 12. Pursuant to the Commission's
internal rules of procedure, "the Commission may assign to its Members areas in which they
will have special responsibility for preparing the Commission's business and for implement-
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temporary structures to deal with particular matters, as in the case of the
Consumer Policy Service. Such a structure, however, may not in fact
operate very differently from a subject-matter directorate.36
The Directorates-General are further divided by subject matter into
Directorates (headed by Directors), which in turn are subdivided into Units
(headed by "heads of unit")." It is normally within the various Units of
the Commission--commonly referred to as the Commission's "services" to
distinguish them from Commissioners who actually make up the Commission-that responsibility for carrying out the Commission's basic tasks is
lodged. Alongside the sectoral Directorates-General are the Commission's
Secretariat-General (responsible for preparing and coordinating the work of
the Commission as such),3" as well as the Commission's Legal Service and
other more specialized "horizontal" units.39
Each Commissioner has a cabinet, consisting of a small number of
advisors, freely chosen by the Commissioner.4" Often, but by no means
invariably, the Commissioner chooses cabinet members from among
persons of his or her own nationality. One member of the cabinet serves
as chef de cabinet, or top personal assistant to the Commissioner. The
chefs de cabinet often are able to reach final political agreement on a
matter at their weekly meetings (typically Mondays), thus relieving the
Commissioners from having to take up the matter at their own crowded
weekly sessions (typically the following Wednesday). Special inter-cabinet
committees (grouping the cabinet members of the various Commissioners
working in the same area) also may meet in order to advance the various
dossiers then under consideration.
The E.C. Treaty confers on the European Commission a wide variety of
important tasks, including:

ing its decisions. A member of the Commission to whom an area of responsibility is so
assigned shall give instructions to the relevant department or departments." Id. In fact, a
Director-General may on occasion report to more than one Commissioner, depending on the
matter at hand and, conversely, some Commissioners are responsible for more than one
Directorate-General.
36. Id.art. 19.
37. Id. art. 18.
38. COMMISSION R. OF PROC., supra note 31, art. 15. The Secretary-General also
functions as secretary to the Commission and is the only non-Commissioner to sit at the
Commission table when it meets. Id.art. 8. He or she presides over weekly meetings of
the Commissioners' Chefs de Cabinet (Mondays) and of the Directors-General (Thursdays).
He or she is also responsible for Commission relations with the other Community institutions. Id. art. 15.
39. Id.art. 20.
40. The cabinet is the "personal staff' to the Commissioners. Id. art. 14.
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41
(a) direct implementation of certain treaty articles;
(b) promulgation of "tertiary" legislation 42 in implementation of the
Council's own "secondary" legislation;
agreements and conduct of external
(c) negotiation of international
43
relations more generally;
(d) direct enforcement of 44E.C. policy in the area of competition law and
state aids to industry;
State requests for various derogations
(e) the grant or denial of Member
4
from E.C. law obligations;
(f) the prosecution of infringement actions against Member States for
their E.C.law violations;4 6 and
(g) representation of the Community interest in legal actions before the
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance.47
Politically, the most important instrument of power of the Commission-and certainly the most critical one for purposes of regulatory
cooperation with foreign government authorities-is the power to formulate
and propose E.C. legislation. This particular function is described more
fully in the following section.

B.

The Commission's Role in InitiatingLegislative Measures

This section examines the general procedural constraints on the
Commission in its capacity as proponent of legislation for adoption by the
Council as E.C. regulations or directives. Viewed from a U.S. perspective,
the Commission and its Directorates-General appear to enjoy a high degree
of autonomy in determining how to formulate a draft regulation or
directive. Although the Council, Commission and Parliament must follow
one or another fairly clear legislative procedure before a proposal may be
enacted into law, the procedure by which the Commission formulates the
initial proposal is relatively unstructured. The Commission has consider-

41. See note 8 supra (listing E.C. Treaty provisions granting the Commission direct
regulatory authority).
42. E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 155, fourth indent.
43. Id art. 228(1).
44. Id. arts. 89, 90, 91, 93.
45. Id. arts. 100a(h), 115.
46. Id. art. 169.
47. See STEPHEN WEATHERHILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, E.C. LAW: THE ESSENTIAL
GUIDE To THE LEGAL WORKINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 65 (2d ed. 1995).
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able procedural freedom under its own rules of procedure and its Manual
of Operational Procedures48 when acting in this capacity.
1. Launching a Regulatory Initiative
Ideas for new legislative measures may originate anywhere in the
Commission, whether in the office of one of the Commissioners or
Directors-General, or from any point within the Units into which the
Directorates-General and Directorates are further divided. Ideas may be
generated not only by individuals or teams found within the Commission
hierarchy, but also by the many outside persons and institutions with which
the Commissioners, their staffs or the services interact. These include
members of the other major institutions of the E.C. (notably the Council
and Parliament), persons from different echelons within the Member State
governments, and persons involved in the lobbying efforts conducted by
private sector groups and public interest organizations.
The E.C. Treaty formally invites the Council to request the Commission
to submit legislative proposals on a particular subject matter.49 As
amended by the Maastricht Treaty, the E.C. Treaty extends this right of
request to the European Parliament 0 and, within limits, to the Committee
of Regions, the European Monetary Institute, the Member States and the
European Council." Other bodies, whether set up directly by the E.C.
Treaty (as in the case of the Economic and Social Committee [ECOSOC]
or the Monetary Committee) or, more often, pursuant to Council legislation,
may also play this role. As a practical matter, however, the Commission
itself determines whether a particular regulatory initiative will be pursued.5" It also determines the timing, the conceptual framework, and the
content of the initiative.
2. The Role of the Commission Services
Once the Commission decides to pursue a legislative proposal on a given
subject, the project is placed in the hands of a Commission official within
the appropriate or "lead" 53 Directorate-General.5 4 Usually a "working

48.

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, MANUAL OF OPERATIONAL PROCE-

DURES (7th update) (Sept. 1994).
49. E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 152.

50. Id.art. 138b.
51. Id. arts. 138b, 198, 198c, 109d, 109f(4).
52. JEAN BouLouis, DROIT INST1TUTIONNEL DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPtENNES 129 (4th

ed. 1993).
53.

Spence, supra note 32, at 104.
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party," consisting of other Commission staff (most likely representing a
number of interested services) and various outside experts and consultants,
is assembled under that official's chairmanship. On other occasions, the
process begins instead with a Commission "green paper," setting out
general policy guidelines and serving as the basis for consultations with
interested parties. The Directorate-General in which the project is
undertaken" typically draws up a Working Document describing the issues
that the legislation is expected to address, and progressively amends that
document as the legislative work proceeds.56 The legislative efforts can
extend over months and even years. As part of a recent campaign to
improve the "openness" and "transparency" of its regulatory processes, the
Commission is seeking to widen and deepen its consultations with Member
States (including national parliaments) and with private sector and public
interest groups during the period in which its legislative proposals are
taking shape. Nevertheless, the Commission reserves almost complete
discretion over the quantity and timing of consultations to be had, the range
of persons and institutions whose participation is to be engaged, and the
intensity of that participation. The Commission's annual programme
reflects the legislative projects undertaken by the Commission services."
The Commission has an extensive network of both permanent and ad hoc
advisory committees which not only furnish the services with technical and
policy advice on issues requiring special expertise, but which also provide
them with early warning of the difficulties a policy initiative may encounter
as it moves toward adoption as a proposal by the Commission, comment by
Parliament and other bodies, and decision in the Council. A first category
consists of "expert" committees composed of specialists of various sorts
Their advice is especially
nominated by the national governments.
welcome because they may anticipate Member State objections. Expert
committee members may even reappear in the Working Groups that will
eventually advise the Council, should the measure later come before the
latter for adoption. A second category consists of "consultative" committees organized and funded by the Commission to collect the views of
different private economic groupings without the involvement of the

54. Id.
55. It is a general rule that only one Directorate-General should be the lead department.
MANUAL OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, supra note 48, § 8.1.2.
56. Id. § 8.1.1. "The Directorate-General responsible for the matter in hand takes the
lead in drawing up the document in due form on the responsibility of the appropriate
Member of the Commission." Id.§ 9.2.

57. COMMISSION R. OF PROC., supra note 31, art. 4.
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Member State governments. Their members are drawn heavily from among
the full-time employees of various economic associations and groups, such
as labor, industry or particular agricultural sectors. The extent of reliance
on such committees, and the extent of their influence, vary greatly among
Directorates-General .58
Assuming the legislative project is not shelved or subsumed under
initiatives taken by another Commission division, the effort, will in
principle culminate in a preliminary draft proposal. Although this proposal
may not be published officially, it is circulated among other Commission
services that may have an interest in it,59 as well as among the Member
States (including both their parliaments and their administrations) and
among relevant private and public organizations.
Lobbying of the
Commission services on behalf of affected interests has become a common
feature of the process.6"
3. From Preliminaryto Final Draft Proposal
The transition of the proposal from preliminary to final draft depends on
the commentary received and the difficulty of the necessary compromises.
While the preliminary proposal will have taken fairly concrete shape by this
time, it is still widely open to comment and to change. At some point in

58. NUGENT, supra note 20, at 68-69.
59. The Commission's Rules of Procedure call for departments involved in the
preparation of Commission decisions to work together as closely as possible. COMMISSION
R. OF PROC. supra note 31, art. 20, para. 1. More specifically, the department responsible
for a measure is required to consult with other departments associated or concerned with the
subject in sufficient time before submitting the measure to the Commission. Id para. 2.
According to the Commission's Manual of Operational Procedures, "[t]o ensure efficient
cooperation and optimum consultation, the lead department should make informal contact
with the other departments concerned as soon as it begins work on drafting a proposal."
MANUAL OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, supra note 48, § 8.1.1.
It is further provided that mention shall be made of any important files currently
under consideration or about to go before the Commission at the weekly meeting of the
several Directors-General. Id. § 8.1.2. The Manual also provides that, "the DirectorateGeneral responsible must involve from the outset all the other departments with an interest
in the topic in question or in some aspect of it." Id. § 9.3.
60. There are reported to be around 3,000 special interest groups active in Brussels.
Sonia Mazey & Jeremy Richardson, The Commission and the Lobby, in THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION 169, 180 (G. Edwards & D. Spence 1994). "Officials also know that they need
to mobilize the support of those interests directly affected by EC legislative proposals since
the legislation is otherwise unlikely to be adopted by the Council or implemented effectively.
Mostgroups therefore experience little difficulty in gaining accessto Commission officials."
Id. at 178.
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the process, as the focus sharpens, the Commissioner who is responsible for
the Directorate-General in which this legislative activity is centered
becomes closely involved in revisions of the preliminary draft proposal.
Should the measure eventually come before the full Commission for
adoption as a proposal, it is this Commissioner who normally plays the
leading role.
Under the Commission's internal rules of procedure, the reworked
proposal is subject to a number of required consultations. These include
consultations with the other Commission services that are legitimately
interested,6' with the individual Commissioner in charge of the Directorate-General that is responsible (to the extent that he or she is not already
involved), and with any outside committee that is required under the Treaty
to be consulted at this stage.62 It is impossible to generalize about the
amount of change that these consultations are likely to produce. However
seriously their criticism may be taken, none of the bodies consulted is in a
position to insist that changes be made to the proposal. The furthest the
rules go in this direction is to provide that the service in charge must
consider and attempt to accommodate the views of the other interested
services within the Commission and, where unable to do so, at least
acknowledge those views in the final draft proposal.63 It is also customary
for the proposal to be submitted to the office of each of the other
Commissioners, where it is then assigned for study and discussion either to
a working group composed of the interested Commissioners or the
appropriate members of their cabinets. It is fair to say that the Working
Party-at this point in close contact over the matter with the responsible

61. COMMISSION R. OF PROC., supra note 31, art. 20. See Spence, supra note 32, at
105-107. Weekly meetings of the Directors-General and the Chefs de Cabinet of the
Commissioners, as well as meetings of the standing "Inter Service Groups," help ensure that
such coordination occurs.
62. These may include, among others, the Monetary Committee and the Economic and
Social Committee. See PHILIP RAWORTH, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN
CoMMuNITY 32-33 (1993) [hereinafter RAWORTH].
63. COMMISSION R. OF PROC., supra note 31, art. 20, para. 3. According to the
Commission's Manual of Operational Procedures:
The object of the coordination exercise should be to achieve as wide a consensus
as possible. In the event of disagreement, if the originating department feels it is
justified in adhering to its original proposal despite objections from the other
departments, it should explain its reasons and, if so requested, record the
differences of opinion when making its submission to the Commission.
Irreconcilable differences of opinion should be objectively recorded by the
department responsible in the document submitted to the Commission.
§ 8.1.1. See also id. § 9.3.
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Commissioner and other Commission members or their staff-will endeavor
to find some sort of common ground, though without undue sacrifice to the
measure's central objectives or to its overall coherence.
4. Regulatory Impact Analyses
The Commission's proposal-making procedures require the preparation
of several different "impact analyses." One such analysis is the so-called
"small and medium-sized business impact analysis," required to be
submitted to the Commission's Directorate-General XXIII (DG XXIII).
Under the Commission's Manual of Operational Procedures, each text
submitted to the Commission for adoption as a legislative proposal must be
analyzed in terms of its economic impact on small and medium-sized
businesses.6" This assessment is meant to cover not only the proposed
rules' direct economic implications for small and medium-sized businesses,
but also the compliance costs and administrative burdens that it would
impose on them.66 In its review, DG XXIII may question the adequacy
or accuracy of the analysis, and its questions may cause the responsible
service to revise its analysis.67 DG XXIII does not, however, have
authority to require that changes be made to the proposed measure.68
The published procedures of the Commission also now require the
responsible service to demonstrate, in a memorandum accompanying the
final proposal, that it considered and rejected regulatory alternatives.69
Consideration of regulatory alternatives is meant to promote respect for the
general principle of "proportionality." The principle, established by the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and more recently affirmed in the

64. Id. § 9.5.1.(ii). See also id. at Annex 20 (providing copy of impact assessment
form).
65. MANUAL OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, supra note 48, § 9.5.1.(ii).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. id.
69. "So as to avoid any initial bias, the originating department should at an early stage
provide all the facts and general information on which its proposals are based, including any
arguments in favor of alternative solutions. If several options are available, the originating
department should give the reasons for its preference at the outset." Id. § 8.1,1.
Documents provided to the Commission in support of a proposed measure are required
to provide "all the information required for assessingthe political and/or economic context"
as well as to mention "any alternative solutions.., and their respective merits." MANUAL
OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, supra note 48, § 9.5.1.
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Maastricht amendments to the E.C. Treaty, requires the E.C., in essence, to
favor the least restrictive alternative.7 °
As amended at Maastricht, the E.C. Treaty also expresses a general E.C.
law principle of "subsidiarity," meaning that the E.C. should not take
legislative action within fields of concurrent E.C. and Member State
jurisdiction if action at the Member State level could adequately accomplish
the E.C.'s objectives. 7' Accordingly, the Commission's internal rules now
require that the explanatory memorandum accompanying a final text for
adoption as a Commission proposal contain a statement demonstrating that
the proposal also is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity.72 Finally,
under the E.C. Treaty, as amended at Maastricht, the Commission must
ensure that all legislative proposals to the Council can be financed, so far
as E.C. expenditures are concerned, from the E.C.'s own resources.73 The
"fiche financi6re" which is required to accompany any proposal for
adoption by the Commission, sets out the proposal's financial implications;
as the E.C. has limited resources to be allocated among an increasing
number of policy areas, this information will influence the Commissioners
in their ultimate decision making.
5. Legal Service Review
Before it is finally submitted to the Commission for adoption, a
legislative proposal must be submitted to the Commission Legal Service for
formal legal review.74 This may not, however, be the first time in the
long process of legislative development that the matter will have come
before the Legal Service. The responsible Commission service is likely to
have consulted the Legal Service previously on one or more issues of law

70. E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 3b, para. 3.
71. Id. para. 2.
72. Internal Commission procedures had already required that the explanatory
memorandum contain a paragraph outlining the difficulties that Member States could expect
to encounter in implementing any E.C. directive that was contemplated. MANUAL OF
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, supra note 48, § 9.5.1 (b).
73. E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 201a. The Directorates-General responsible for
budgets, personnel and administration must be consulted on all proposed measures that may
have implications for budget and finances, personnel, or administration, respectively.
COMMISSION R. OF PROC., supra note 31, art. 20, para. 2. See also MANUAL OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, supra note 48 §§ 9.4.2., 9.4.3. Their statements on a proposed
measure are required to accompany the measure when sent to the Commission for approval.
Id. § 9.5.1.
74. COMMISSION R. OF PROC., supra note 31, art. 20, para. 2. See also MANUAL OF
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, supra note 48, § 9.4.1.
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which may have surfaced in the drafting process." The Legal Service's
final review of the text will focus on the measure's legality, as measured
by all relevant norms of E.C. law, both substantive and procedural. With
the proliferation of legislative procedures under the Treaty-each providing
different institutional roles for the Parliament, Council and Commission, as
well as different voting majorities in the Council-the Legal Service has
increasingly focused on the question of the "correctness" of the proposal's
"legal basis" in the Treaty, but its review covers the full range of legal
issues that the proposal raises. In the end, the Legal Service gives a
favorable or unfavorable opinion on the text in question. In the latter
event, the Legal Service states its reasons in a note attached to the draft
measure submitted for approval to the Commission.76
6. Adoption of a Proposalby the Commission
At this point, the final draft proposal is conveyed to the responsible
Commissioner, accompanied by (1) an explanatory memorandum containing
any required impact analyses, (2) the opinion of the Legal Service, and (3)
any committee opinions required by the Treaty." That Commissioner's
objective, presumably, is to have the draft adopted by the Commission
acting as a collegial body; in any event, it is he or she who will move the
proposal's adoption.7" To that end, the draft is first submitted to the
relevant cabinet committee-i.e., a committee chaired by the relevant
cabinet member of the Commission President and consisting of his or her
counterparts in the cabinets of the other Commissioners-with a member
of the responsible Commission service also present. If the proposal is
expected to be adopted under the Commission's expedited "written
procedure," the cabinet members will not actually meet, unless of course
agreement by written procedure is blocked. Assuming it is successful, the
written procedure dispenses with the requirement of discussion and vote at
a full meeting of the Commissioners.79 In all other cases, the final draft
75. "The Legal Service must be consulted as soon as possible on any proposals which
involved legal drafting." MANUAL OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, supra note 48, § 8.1.1.
76. Id. § 9.4.1.
77. Also attached to the proposal will be the opinions of the Directorates-General for
Budget, Financial Control, Personnel and Administration. See id. § 9.5.1.
78. COMMISSION R. OF PROC., supra note 31, art. 6.
79. Id. art. 10. The written procedure may be used only if the Directorates-General
involved and the Legal Service are agreeable to that procedure. Id. A "written procedure"
may also be used at the Cabinet level. Id. In other words, if there is previous agreement
at the level of the Directorates-General, the cabinet members may themselves reach
agreement without actually meeting.
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proposal will be presented for discussion at such a meeting.8" Even then,
the chefs de cabinet of the Commissioners, presided over by the SecretaryGeneral, will meet in advance of the Commissioners' own meeting with a
view toward reaching agreement on as many remaining issues as possible,
so that the Commissioners themselves can focus strictly on matters of
disagreement. The cabinets thus play a major role in Commission policy
making. Among other things, they enable individual Commissioners to
consider and determine how to vote on issues lying outside their main areas
of responsibility" and to deal directly and continually with lobbyists.82
Under the chairmanship of the Commission's Secretary-General, the
Commissioners meet at weekly sessions to reach their most important
decisions, including the decision to adopt a proposal for legislation. These
closed meetings83 may end with the proposal's adoption (with or without
amendment), either by consensus or by an actual vote, with passage
requiring an absolute majority vote of the Commissioners in favor.8 4
Often, however, the dossier will be remitted to the responsible Commission
service for further work on one or more outstanding issues. In truth, the
Commissioners have wide discretion over the draft proposal before them.
"They may accept it, reject it, refer it back to the Directorate-General for
redrafting, or defer making a decision."8 5
Once the proposal is adopted, the Translation Service translates the text
into all the E.C.'s official languages.8 6 The proposal is then published as

80. Id. art. 2.
81. Martin Donnelly & Ella Ritchie, The Collegeof CommissionersandTheir Cabinets,
in THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 31, 41 (G. Edwards & D. Spence, eds., 1994). See Peter
Ludlow, The European Commission, in THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 85, 93 (R.
Keohane & S. Hoffmann, eds. 1991).
82. Donnelly & Ritchie, supra note 81, at 45, 46. See Martin Donnelly, The Structure
of the European Commission and the Policy FormulationProcess, in LOBBYING IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 74 (S. Mazey & J. Richardson, eds., 1994).
83. COMMISSION R. OF PROC., supra note 31, art. 7. Also, Commission discussions
must be kept confidential. Id.
84. Id.art. 6, para. 3.
85. NUGENT, supra note 20, at 63. According to one authority:
[W]hat makes the Commission work in practice . . . is the existence of a layer of
procedures designed almost to ensure that real power remains outside the services
and is focused in the Cabinetsystem. It is almost as if Commissioners and their
Cabinetslet the Services play the game of policy-making, consultation of interest
groups and inter-institutional relations, while reserving both judgement and the
exercise of real power to themselves.
Spence, supra note 32, at 113.
86. WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 47, at 153.
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an official document, accompanied by a revised explanatory memorandum. 7 In keeping with the principle of subsidiarity, the memorandum, in
relevant cases, will recite the Commission's basis for concluding that action
at the E.C. rather than the Member State level was necessary to achieve the
E.C.'s regulatory objectives." The proposal is then ready for submission
to the Council for action. 9
7. From Commission Proposal to Council Measure
The legislative course of a measure following its submission by the
Commission to the Council varies with the particular legislative procedure
required to be followed under the relevant Treaty article. Depending on the
applicable article, the Parliament either may be consulted or may enjoy the
additional prerogatives entailed in parliamentary cooperation or parliamentary co-decision. Similarly, there may be either immediate Council action on
the Commission proposal or, more likely, two readings in the Parliament
and Council, and possibly (under the co-decision procedure) intervention
by a Joint Conciliation Committee.90 How forcefully Parliament may
influence the outcome depends on whether the parliamentary cooperation
or parliamentary co-decision procedure is in effect.9
For the reasons set out earlier, however, these stages of the legislative
process-though politically and institutionally crucial-are not the ones that
are likely to give priority to international regulatory coordination with U.S.
or other overseas regulatory counterparts. Prospects for coordination are
unlikely to surface for the first time during the Parliament's or the
Council's political deliberations over the proposed text. Nor is new
information about the parallel regulatory policies of other countries likely
to be added to the legislative dossier at this point. In other words, any
serious consideration of coordinating E.C. rules with rules of the U.S. will
have to have been given by the Commission if it is to have any influence
over the regulatory result at all. It is unrealistic to suppose that the
Parliament or Council, which have fewer means and weaker political
incentives than the Commission to explore the international regulatory

87. Id. at 108.
88. Id. at 108-09.
89. The Commission's Secretary-General is responsible for ensuring official notification and publication of Commission instruments in the Official Journal of the European
Communities, and for transmitting the documents to other Community institutions.
COMMISSION R. OF PROC., supra note 31, art. 15.
90. E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 189b.
91. Id.
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dimension of a given problem, will introduce or advance this perspective
if the groundwork for doing so has not already been laid.
In further appreciating the Commission's freedom to initiate legislative
proposals, it bears emphasizing that under all the E.C.'s legislative
procedures, the Commission has the right to modify or withdraw a
proposed measure even after it has been put before the Council, unless it
has been formally adopted by the Council. 92 This has been a central
feature of the E.C. legislative process from the very beginning and remains
so today. Thus, the Commission may alter a proposal unilaterally, even
while it is under active consideration by the Parliament or the Council,
provided the Commission follows its own internal rules in so doing. The
significance of this prerogative lies in the fact that, while the Council often
is able to adopt the Commission's proposal by a qualified majority vote of
its members, the Council, under most procedures, can adopt a different text
(that is, different from the Commission's original or amended proposal)
only if it acts to do so unanimously.9 The Commission's continual right
to amend its proposals thus gives whatever its current policy preferences
happen to be an ongoing advantage as far as adoption by the Council is
concerned. Of course, if the Commission elects to withdraw its proposal
altogether, the Council (or Council and Parliament, under the co-decision
procedure) cannot then enact it in any version.94
II.

COMMISSION PRACTICES AND POLICIES ON REGULATORY
COOPERATION WITH U.S. AGENCIES

The preceding parts of this Article sought to demonstrate how and why
the Commission bears primary responsibility on the E.C. side for conducting whatever regulatory dialogue can be expected to develop with U.S.
regulatory agencies. Part II of this Article examines the practices and
policies of the Commission in this respect. It begins with a description of
the legal and political framework within which such regulatory dialogue
occurs.
It then examines the Commission's policies and practices
themselves, both at the "services" level and at the higher "political" level.

92. E.C. TREATY, supra note 2, art. 189a(2).
93. Id. art. 189a(1).
94. See generally RAWORTH, supra note 62, at 26.
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The Services'Basic Freedom to Cooperatewith Overseas
Governments

A.

Although the matter has not been conclusively decided, most indications
are that the Commission's various services are free to engage in at least
some forms of direct bilateral cooperation with counterpart units of the U.S.
government. The prevailing attitude thus resembles that of U.S. regulatory
agencies, which likewise tend to assume that they need no express
authorization from Congress or the President before engaging in international regulatory cooperation. Of the examples of U.S.-E.C. regulatory
95
cooperation discussed in a later section of this Article, few have been
expressly authorized at the top levels of government.
B.

The TransatlanticDeclaration

If the Commission services were to look for textual authority to conduct
bilateral regulatory cooperation with U.S. agencies, they would find at least
some such authority in the Transatlantic Declaration of November 22,
1990.96 This document-which, as its name suggests, is no more than a
declaration 9 7---expresses a political commitment at the highest levels of the
U.S. and the E.C. to collaborate in addressing and solving problems of
common interest. The Declaration states in pertinent part that the U.S. and
E.C. (including the Member States) "will inform and consult each other on
important matters of common interest, both political and economic, with a
view to bringing their positions as close as possible, without prejudice to
their respective independence."9' Some, though by no means most, of the
subjects mentioned in the Declaration directly implicate regulation. These
include "technical and non-tariff barriers to industrial and agricultural trade,
services, .

.

. transportation policy, standards, telecommunications, [and]

95. See infra Part II.D.
96. BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, vol. 23, no. 11, point 1.5.3 (1990)
[herinafter BULL. E.C.]. The official title is Declaration on Relations between the European
Economic Community and the United States. See E.C. and US. Reinforce Transatlantic
Partnership,EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NEWS, No. 41/90 (Nov. 27, 1990).

97. Some European leaders have urged that political, economic, and security relations
between the U.S. and the E.U. be placed within the framework of a formal treaty, rather
than a mere declaration, evidently so that the U.S. might be held more closely accountable
for various of its unilateral measures, chiefly in the trade sphere. See Euro Parliamentarians
Urge Economic Treaty with US., EUROWATCH, at 5 (Mar. 21, 1994).
98.

BULL. E.C., supra note 96, at 91.
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high technology." 99 The U.S. and E.C. also specifically agreed in the
Declaration to engage in joint research and exchanges in science and
technology, as well as in education and culture.' 0
In concrete terms, the Transatlantic Declaration establishes a framework
for "regular and intensive consultation" between U.S. and E.C. authorities.' The chief institutional components of this framework include:
(a) biannual consultations between the Presidents of the Commission
and the Council, on the one hand, and the U.S. President, on the
other;
(b) biannual consultations between the E.C. Foreign Ministers and the
Commission, on the one hand, and the U.S. Secretary of State, on
the other;
(c) biannual consultations between the Commission and the U.S.
government at the cabinet level; and
(d) other ad hoc consultations and briefings.0 2
These meetings have been held with the intended regularity. 3 At a July
1994 summit, however, the then President Delors, Chancellor Kohl
(Council President) and President Clinton decided to improve the
functioning of the transatlantic summits by having each of the three
presidents name representatives to act as "personal contact points" for
coordinating and facilitating work by experts in follow-up from, and
preparation for, summit meetings.'0 4 Notwithstanding the emphasis on
high-level political meetings, the Transatlantic Declaration evidently
envisages bilateral government contacts at all levels, including what may
be considered the "grass-roots" agency level. The importance of developing "an effective working relationship at all levels" has been forcefully
underlined by the Commission. 5 Besides facilitating regulatory convergence, action at the agency level has the capacity to serve as "an early
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

COMMISSION PAPER ON E.C.-U.S. RELATIONS, supra note 4, at 8-9.
104. US-E.C. Summit Marks New Stage in an Expanding Partnership, U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, LETTER FROM BRUSSELS, at 6 (Aug. 10, 1994).

For discussion of the political history of the Declaration see generally Youri Devuyst,
European Community Integration and the United States: Toward a New Transatlantic
Relationship?, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 5 (1990).

105. See US.-E.C. Relations: More Contacts with U.S. Urged to Avoid Trans-Atlantic
Conflicts, EUROWATCH (Apr. 19, 1993) (quoting certain confidential E.C. documents). See
also COMMISSION PAPER ON E.C.-U.S. RELATIONS, supra note 4, at 9 (emphasizing need for

"broadening and intensifying" E.C.-U.S. relations).
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warning system in order to detect and to resolve trade issues before they
develop into political problems."' 6
The Transatlantic Declaration appears to have generated U.S.-E.C.
cooperation chiefly in non-regulatory fields, thus fields lying beyond the
scope of this Article. As was probably the signers' intent, discussions held
under the Declaration's banner thus far have related mostly to (a) the
coordination of U.S. and European foreign policies toward third countries
(typically in relation to discrete international crises) and (b) the negotiation
and resolution of direct bilateral trade disputes between the U.S. and E.C.,
notably over allegations of unfair trade practices.0 7 Meetings held
pursuant to the Transatlantic Declaration accordingly have dealt with such
foreign relations issues as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, unrest in Central
America and Africa, civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, and developments
in the former Soviet Republics and in the other countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. The meetings also have focused on trade issues, and, more
particularly, on the difficulties associated with concluding the GATT
Uruguay Round. In the naturally more confrontational field of international
trade policy, each side has adopted the practice of periodically setting out
in writing its trade grievances against the other. For its part, the Commission (through the Directorate-General for External Relations) publishes an
annual report listing alleged U.S. barriers to trade and investment, and other
unfair practices. 10
In point of fact, the distinction between trade disputes, on the one hand,
and regulatory harmonization, on the other, is not always a sharp one. The
Commission's annual report on U.S. trade and investment barriers explicitly
recognizes that trade and investment barriers result from not only the direct
exercise by governments of distinct and overtly protectionist trade
instruments (taxes, tariffs, customs, quotas, subsidies, dumping and
procurement policies), but also from their exercise of conventional
regulatory powers.0 9 The 1992 report specifically noted that divergent
economic regulations among trading partners, each adopted for valid

106. See Commission Paperon E.C.-US. Relations, supranote 4. See also PROGRESS
REPORT ON E.C./U.S. RELATIONS 5 (May 1993) (discussing need for international
cooperation and economic coordination).
107. Official accounts of the summits held under the Declaration clearly reflect an
emphasis on foreign affairs and bilateral trade relations. See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 27TH GENERAL REPORT supra note 1, at 252-55 (discussing
Western Economic Summit).
108. SERVICES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1995 REPORT ON U.S. BARRIERS TO
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 65 (May 1995).
109. Id.
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domestic reasons, resulted in significant barriers to trade, and it urged that
an "in-depth bilateral dialogue of the type envisaged by the Transatlantic
Declaration" be conducted to reduce these barriers."'
A third category of affairs contemplated by the Transatlantic Declaration
covers general cooperation in law enforcement, including such high-profile
activities as combating terrorism, international crime and international
traffic in drugs."' Law enforcement, however, also has its more routine
aspects. Two notable cooperation agreements on law enforcement-in the
securities and competition law areas-are taken up in a later section of this
Article." 2
The Transatlantic Declaration is in fact sweeping enough to encompass
transatlantic governmental coordination in virtually any domain in which
it might be desirable."' Miscellaneous global issues such as overpopulation, nuclear proliferation, unemployment and slow economic growth have
all figured on its agenda. More recently, the Commission specifically
endorsed the general phenomenon of international regulatory cooperation
as an important form of activity to be pursued under the Transatlantic
Declaration." 4
C. Legal Limits on Formal Regulatory Cooperation
As the preceding discussion implies, the Commission services enjoy
substantial freedom to determine whether and how to act in concert with
overseas regulatory authorities. To that extent, their initiatives are governed
by political rather than legal considerations. Nevertheless, the Court of
Justice's recent ruling in France v Commission,"' decided in the context
of the U.S.-E.C. competition law agreement, suggests that the Commission
is subject to at least certain procedural requirements when it enters into
binding legal agreements for regulatory cooperation with other govern-

110. BULL. E.C. vol. 25, No. 4, point 1.4.17, at 29-70 (1992). For a similar observation
in the 1993 annual report, see BULL. E.C. vol. 26, No. 4, point 1.3.29 (1993).
I11. BULL. E.C. vol. 23, No. 11, point 1.5.3, at 91 (1990).
112. See infra part lI.D.l.c.i. (discussing mutual assistance in enforcement).
113. Thus, the ministerial meeting held in Brussels in November 1990 resulted in two
joint U.S.-E.C. declarations on bilateral cooperation. These announced the establishment of
new working parties to foster cooperation in science and technology, on the one hand, and
in higher education and continuing training, on the other. BULL. E.C. vol. 23, No. 11, point
1.4.11 (1990).
114. GROWTH, COMPETITIVENESS AND EMPLOYMENT: THE CHALLENGES AND WAYS
FORWARD INTO THE 21ST CENTURY,

WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES.

115.

Case C-327/91, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3666.
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ments." 6 To the extent that an agreement of this sort obligates the
Community toward third party governments, and thus exposes the E.C. to
liability under international law, it must be considered as constituting a
binding international agreement whose negotiation, signing, and ratification
are subject to the specific treaty-making procedures set out in the E.C.
Treaty." 7' Thus, although it may engage in exploratory discussions
without any formal mandate or negotiating directive from the Council, the
Commission must eventually report to the Council and, in any event, seek
a formal mandate before making any formal international legal commitment." 8
Moreover, the Council alone may ratify a binding international
agreement on behalf of the E.C. In reaching the conclusion that the
Commission had overstepped its powers by entering into the agreement on
its own authority, the Court in France v Commission rejected several
impressive arguments by the Commission, namely:
(a) that the agreement contemplated purely "administrative" cooperation
between U.S. and E.C. authorities, rather than cooperation in
substantive policymaking, and was thus a mere "administrative
arrangement";' 9
(b) that the agreement by its own terms expressly reserved to the
signatories the right to withhold cooperation when required by their
respective competition law principles;'
(c) that the obligations created under the agreement (exchange of
information, cooperation, coordination) were extremely limited, and
were imposed exclusively on the Commission and not on other E.C.
2
or non-E.C. actors;1 '
(d) that performance by the Commission of its obligations under the
22
agreement would not entail additional budgetary expenditures;
(e) that the Commission could have achieved similar results through a
purely oral and informal understanding with the Americans, but had
preferred a more visible framework;2 3 and

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
France v. Commission, [1994] ECR 1-3666, at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id
Id.
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(f) that the agreement fell within a sphere----competition policy-in
which the Commission enjoys the broadest of policymaking
responsibility in the E.C. law context."'
Under the Court's ruling, arguably, the Commission lacks authority to
commit itself to following any particular form of cooperation with foreign
authorities, including consultation in the preparation of draft regulatory
texts or even the sharing of underlying data, without observing the treatymaking procedures laid down in the E.C. Treaty. Under this reading, the
Commission may cooperate as fully as it wishes with overseas authorities,
without observing any prior formalities, but may not, on its own, obligate
itself to do so. Only by entering into a "mere" joint declaration or
"gentlemen's agreement," rather than a binding international agreement,
may the Commission escape the E.C. Treaty's procedures for treatymaking."5
D.

Commission Practicesand Policies on Regulatory Cooperationwith
US. Agencies

Even if the Transatlantic Declaration furnishes an overall political
framework for regulatory dialogue with the U.S., it provides very little dayto-day machinery for the conduct of that dialogue. Thus, responsibility for
determining whether and how to conduct regulatory cooperation with U.S.
agencies-and for actually carrying it out-essentially rests with the
Commission services themselves. This is consistent with the view that,
subject to the strictures of France v Commission, international regulatory
cooperation is a fully appropriate activity for the services to pursue. The
first part of this section thus focuses on bilateral regulatory cooperation at
the services level. On the other hand, a measure of responsibility for
general oversight and coordination of activity at the service level has been
assumed by the Unit for Relations with the U.S.A. (organized within the
Commission's Directorate-General for External Relations, or DG I) and by
a bilateral "Sub-Cabinet Group" headed (for the E.C.) by the DirectorGeneral of DG I and (for the U.S.) by the Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs." 6 I examine the oversight and coordination functions
of these bodies in the concluding part of this section.

124.
125.
126.

Francev. Commission, [1994] ECR 1-3666, at 8.
Id.
Id.
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1. Regulatory Cooperation at the Services Level
Various Commission services have embarked on programs of international regulatory cooperation with U.S. administrative authorities. In most
cases, they have acted on their own initiative, out of a belief on the part of
officials within the service in question that such cooperation would promote
a legitimate Commission objective within that service's sphere of
responsibility. The services tend to undertake such initiatives in one of
three situations: (a) as a direct rulemaking strategy, (b) as a means of
addressing bilateral trade conflicts, and (c) as a means of aiding programs
of mutual assistance in enforcement.
a. Regulatory Cooperation as a Direct Rulemaking Strategy:
ProgrammaticCooperation
In a number of cases, Commission officials have mounted programs of
regulatory cooperation with U.S. agencies because, like their U.S.
counterparts, they viewed such cooperation as a strategy that might be of
use in carrying out their essential rulemaking responsibilities. Typically,
they consider some form of institutionalized dialogue with counterpart U.S.
agencies to be helpful in establishing the relevant regulatory standards
within their sphere of responsibility or in promoting a more fully integrated
world market (to the benefit of producers and consumers alike) in the goods
and services in question. I call efforts of this sort "programmatic" because
they correspond to performance by the Commission of one or more of its
central regulatory tasks.
As the following illustrations will show, it is not essential that such
cooperation be conducted with the United States on an exclusively bilateral
basis.'2 7 Nor do all service-initiated cooperative programs necessarily
exhibit the same degree of commitment or intensity. That commitment or
intensity may be measured according to:
(a) whether participants commit to collaborating,
(b) whether they meet at regular intervals, with agendas,
(c) whether the collaboration entails the occasional sharing of information and exchange of views, on the one hand, or a determined effort
to reach common positions, on the other,
(d) whether the determined effort entails a further commitment to
implement what is agreed upon,
127. Truly multilateral cooperation is beyond the scope of this report, but trilateral
cooperation certainly is not.
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(e) whether deliberations are preceded by joint research and study,
(f) whether what is contemplated are minimum standards or maximum
standards or both,
(g) whether and to what extent formal interventions in each other's
domestic rulemaking processes are envisaged, and
(h) whether participants engage in systematic follow-up on questions of
implementation.
Those Commission services that have chosen to engage in programmatic
cooperation with counterpart U.S. authorities have mostly steered away
from high-intensity, high-commitment forms of programmatic cooperation.
Thus, very rarely do any of the programs entail (a) the creation of full joint
study teams, (b) the parallel initiation of identical regulatory proposals, or
(c) a program of formal written intervention in the other's regulatory
processes, to name just a few of the hallmarks of what may be considered
to be high-intensity cooperation.
i.

PharmaceuticalRegulation

In 1991, the regulatory authorities and industry associations in the E.C.,
U.S. and Japanese pharmaceutical sectors agreed to cooperate in what has
been described as "a very ambitious programme of harmonisation of
quality, safety and efficacy testing requirements to avoid unnecessary
repetition of costly and unethical testing in humans or animals."'2 8 The
following revised terms of reference for this program, known as ICH
(International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use), reveal its breadth and
comprehensiveness:
- To provide a forum for constructive dialogue between regulatory
authorities and the pharmaceutical industry on the real and perceived
differences in the technical requirements for product registration in the
[three regions];
- To identify areas where modifications in technical requirements or
greater mutual acceptance of research and development procedures could

128. FERNAND SAUER, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL
HARMONISATION (Apr. 1994). The primary objective was "to reach consensus on the steps

needed to achieve greater harmonization of technical requirements for medicinal products,
through an active process of discussion, debate and review of science by international
experts of the highest calibre." Martin Bangemann, Welcome Address, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION 2 (Brussels 1991) (P.F.
D'Arcy & D.W.G. Harron, eds., 1991) [hereinafter BRUSSELS HARMONISATION CONFERENCE].
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lead to a more economical use of human, animal and material resources,
without compromising safety;
- To make recommendations on practical ways to achieve greater
harmonization in the interpretation and application of technical guidelines
and requirements for registration."'
The ICH program is guided by a Steering Committee, which draws its
membership from the three regulatory authorities and the industry
cosponsors, and is supported by a Secretariat located in the international
pharmaceutical regulatory body, IFPMA. 3 In November 1991, 1,200
government and industry experts attended the first major ICH conference,
held in the presence of observers (notably Canada, the EFTA and the
WHO) in Brussels."' The second conference, attended by 1,500, took
place in Orlando, Florida, in October 1993. A third major conference was
held in November 1995 in Yokohama, Japan. Between conferences,
however, experts' meetings are held at approximately four-month intervals
in one of the three regions.3 2 Oriented by the ICH Steering Committee,
the working parties discuss and draft trilateral guidelines and position
papers on issues of a more or less technical character, with a view toward
their eventual adoption. The ICH Steering Committee has established the
following five-step process for this purpose:
Step 1:
Preliminary discussion by expert working groups mandated
by the Steering Committee, culminating in a preliminary
draft reviewed by experts until consensus is reached and the
draft 3 is in a position to be forwarded to Steering Commit13
tee.

129. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION
(Orlando 1993) (P.F. D'Arcy & D.W.G. Harron, eds., 1993) [hereinafter ORLANDO
HARMONISATION CONFERENCE]. The ICH has placed an emphasis on safety and efficiency:
A truly streamlined regulatory review process will bring the benefits of costeffective medicines to patients around the world. Toward that end, we must work
to make uniform the nature and extent of the evaluation of new medicines in areas
of non-biological analytical testing, animal pharmacology and safety, and human
efficacy and safety. And we must work to standardise the format and content of
the regulatory submissions that document our scientific findings.
Id. at 17. (opening remarks by William C. Steere, Jr., Chairman and CEO of Pfizer, Inc.).
130. Id. at 2.
131. Like its successor conference, the conference was sponsored jointly by the U.S.,
E.C., and Japanese pharmaceutical regulatory bodies and the U.S., E.C., Japanese and
international pharmaceutical manufacturers associations. Id. at 1.
132. The U.S., Japan, and the E.C. comprise the three regions.
I

133.

ORLANDO HARMONISATION CONFERENCE, supra note 129, at 5.
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Upon Steering Committee recommendation, the draft is
submitted to the three regional agencies for formal consultation under their normal consultation procedures, including
outside groups.'34
After comments are collected, a designated Rapporteur (in
consultation with experts) analyzes the comments and amends
the draft, which is then referred to an ICH Expert Working
Group.135

A final draft is endorsed by the Steering Committee6 which
recommends it for adoption by national regulators.1
The transposition of recommendations into domestic law.'
Step 5:
Thus far, four ICH harmonized guidelines have been adopted as final and
have been transposed into law by the authorities in Europe, the U.S. and
Japan. 3 They deal with: (a) reproductive toxicity in animals, (b) clinical
studies among the elderly, (c) stability testing of new active substances, and
(d) dose response information to support drug registration.' s9 A fifth
Ten
guideline on clinical safety data management is nearly final. 4
additional ICH guidelines are under outside consultation and another six are
Step 4:

4
at the working group stage.' '

ii. Foodstuffs Regulation
The bilateral U.S.-E.C. cooperation in food standards regulation appears
to be somewhat less formal and less intensive than the cooperation in the
pharmaceutical area. 142 This may be because discussions between the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Commission Foodstuffs
Unit serve chiefly (1) to pave the way for the U.S. and E.C. to take joint
positions on proposed amendments to the worldwide Codex

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 6.
137. Id.at 6.
138. ORLANDO HARMONISATION CONFERENCE, supra note 129, at 8-9.
139. Id. at 6.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 6-7.
142. Conversation with Robert Hankin, Deputy Head of Unit, Foodstuffs Legislation and
Scientific and Technical Aspects, European Commission, DG III (Industry). All conversations cited to herein were conducted with the author while in Brussels, Belgium, between
the dates of October 4 and 28, 1995.
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Alimentarius, 143 and (2) to afford advance warning of trade disputes
emerging in the agricultural sector. In addition, of course, the bilateral
meetings permit an exchange of views on certain issues that happen not to
have been addressed thus far by the Codex, as well as on some very broad
issues of principle and regulatory philosophy. The FDA-E.C. Commission
dialogue, inaugurated in 1986, is conducted informally on an annual basis.
The host country prepares the agenda and ultimately the first draft of a
press release. No joint-rulemaking as such has been undertaken within the
framework of this cooperation, however, and it is not envisaged in the near
future.
iii. Science and Technology
Although the two examples just given illustrate differences in both the
form and intensity of cooperation, both focus on rather discrete regulatory
issues. Programmatic cooperation can also be much more diffuse, however.
This describes well the dialogue that has recently been launched in the area
of science and technology. A U.S.-E.C. joint consultative group on science
and technology, chaired jointly by the Assistant to the U.S. President for
Science and Technology and the E.C. Commission Vice-President, held its
first meeting in February 1991, and a second the following year.'44 Its
aim is to conduct high-level consultations on science and technology issues
and a general exchange of information. Its meetings provide an overview
of U.S. and E.C. science policy priorities and a review of ongoing
cooperative research and development (R&D) activities."'

143. The Codex Alimentarius, participated in at present by 144 countries, is designed to
protect the health of food consumers and to promote fair practices in the food trade. It is
promulgated jointly by the FAO and WHO. CODEX ALiMENTARIUS COMMISSION PROCEDURAL MANUAL (7th ed. 1989) [hereinafter CODEX ALIMENTARIUS MANUAL]; see also Sub-

Cabinet Meeting (Brussels, Feb. 2, 1994) (discussing the objective and means of achieving
regulatory cooperation).
144. See BULL. E.C. vol. 23, No. 11, points 1.3.86, 1.4.11 (1990) (describing creation
and activities of Joint Consultative Group on Science and Technology). The agreement
establishing the Joint Consultative Group specifically contemplated creation of a joint task
force on biotechnology research which would report to the Joint Consultative Group. Id.
point 1.3.86. See E.C. TREATY supra note 2, art. 152 (allowing "the Commission to
undertake any studies the Council considers desirable for the attainment of common
objectives").
145. Commission of the European Communities, Press Release, E.C/US. Consultations
on Science and Technology RAPID (Feb. 27, 1991).
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b. Regulatory Cooperationas a Means of Addressing BilateralTrade
Conflicts: Problem-Solving
A second and quite different approach to U.S.-E.C. regulatory cooperation may be described as more problem-solving than programmatic in
nature. This situation arises when a U.S. agency or a Commission service
considers a particular case of regulatory divergence to be problematic from
a bilateral trade point of view. Sometimes it believes the other's standards
to be protectionist in intent or exclusionary in effect; sometimes it simply
observes that the regulatory divergence is costly to its private sector and
thus prejudicial to its trade interests. In these situations, the dialogue tends
to proceed more in an atmosphere of negotiation than in an atmosphere of
neutral scientific inquiry, with strategies of competition predominating over
strategies of cooperation. In fact, the line between simple regulatory
harmonization (of which the cases in the previous section may be
considered examples) and the settlement of trade disputes can become
highly blurred. For this reason, it would be a mistake to exclude these
programs from the scope of international regulatory cooperation.
i.

Meat Import Restrictions

A perfect illustration of regulatory cooperation arising out of conventional agricultural trade disputes is the coordination of health standards for
fresh beef and pork. For years, the U.S. meat industry had complained that
the E.C. was improperly restricting U.S. exports through its so-called Third
Country Meat Directive, which set strict hygiene and inspection standards
for foreign meat plants. 46 In May 1991, amidst claims that increasing
numbers of U.S. slaughterhouses were being unjustifiably "de-listed" for
export to the E.C.,' 47 the U.S. and E.C. agreed to make a systematic
scientific comparison of their regulatory requirements to determine whether
they were basically equivalent. 48 A joint group of U.S.-E.C. veterinary
officials conducted the study from November 1991 through April 1992.'4
It showed that while most of the safeguards were basically equivalent, they

146. U.S. International Trade Commission, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1992 49 (1993).
147. Id. In fact the E.C. eventually banned all imports of U.S. pork (in November 1990)
and beef (in January 1991). Id.The National Pork Producers Council and American Meat
Institute then filed petitions under section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, and the USTR
initiated an investigation. Id.at 49-50.
148. Id. at 50.
149. THE YEAR INTRADE 1992, supra note 146, at 50.
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were accompanied by certain unnecessary legal and administrative
requirements which effectively precluded recognition of that equivalence.
By May 1992, the parties managed to reach agreement on the remaining
equivalency issues."' After further negotiations, and further reliance on
veterinary experts, the two sides entered into a formal agreement by which
they undertook to introduce, within six months from that time, whatever
legal and administrative changes were necessary to ensure the mutual
recognition of health and safety findings. 5' The accord also provided for:
(1) a program of reciprocal site visits of veterinary inspection facilities, (2)
acceptance of a principle of "regionalization" in the control of animal
diseases, which would require the U.S. to recognize that certain individual
Member States were free of specified animal diseases, and (3) agreement
by the E.C. to "consider on the basis of mutual agreement, the possibility
of approving plants certified by FSIS as being in compliance with
E.C.requirements prior to visits by reviewers," a practice evidently then
Interestingly, the parties agreed that this
already adopted by the U.S.'
parties and will constitute a satisfactory
both
of
reviewers
accord "will bind
3
resolution of the current dispute involving the third country Directive."' '
ii. Copyright Protection
Another instance of international regulatory cooperation undertaken to
resolve a bilateral trade dispute is the "dialogue" between the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (Department of Commerce), on the one hand, and
the copyright and neighboring rights division of the Commission's DG XV
(Internal Market and Financial Services), on the other.'54 Within that
dialogue, priority has been given to the elimination of regulatory disparities
considered by either side as constituting unfair competition. A good
example is the current negotiation over harmonizing computer software
copyright protection. Sometimes the parties address problems that are only
emerging, with a view toward preventing full-scale trade disputes. The
150. Id.
151. Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters on 7 May, 1991, Between the
European Economic Community and the United States of America Concerning the Application of the Community Third Country Directive, Council Directive 72/462/EEC, and the
Corresponding United States of America Regulatory Requirements with Respect to Trade
in Fresh Bovine and Porcine Meat, O.J. (L 68) 3 (Mar. 19, 1993).
152. Id.at 3-4.
153. Id.at 4. See generally THE YEAR IN TRADE 1992, supra note 146, at 49-50
(explaining impact of Third Country Meat Directive).
154. Conversation with Paul Vandoren, Head ofUnit, Copyright and Neighboring Rights,
and Unfair Competition, DG XV (Internal Market and Financial Services).
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joint research and negotiation currently underway to develop computer
hardware devices to block the illicit copying of documents illustrate such
"early warning" efforts.'55
iii. Telecommunications
A further illustration of problem-solving regulatory cooperation is the
current program of cooperation between the U.S. Federal Communications
Commission and the Commission's DG XIII (Telecommunications) on
telecommunications issues. Highly informal dialogue seeks to bring about
greater mutual understanding of overall telecommunications strategies-the
"U.S. National Information Infrastructure" and "European Information
Society," respectively.'56 It specifically aims, however, to identify and
eliminate those regulatory features on either side that have a discernible
protectionist effect. This program, which has been described as having a
strong bargaining flavor,' permits U.S. and E.C. authorities to intervene
formally and in writing in opposition to proposed regulatory action by the
other side.' The first meeting of the so-called EU-U.S. Dialogue on the
Information Society took place in Washington, D.C., in November 1994.
Participation has since been broadened to include also Directorates-General
I, III and XV (for the Commission) and the Departments of State and
Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative (USTR) for the
U.S.
iv. Air Transport
Another trade dispute that has given rise to problem-solving regulatory
dialogue concerns restrictions on access to airline-owned computerized

155. See European Commission, Office of Press and Public Affairs, E.U.-U.S. SubCabinet meeting, Feb. 2, 1994, Joint Operational Conclusions (Feb. 4, 1994).
156. See Joint Operational Conclusions, supra note 155. (Telecommunications,
Information Market and Exploitation of Research).
157. Conversation with Alain Servantie, Head of Unit, International Aspects of
Telecommunications and Postal Services, DG XIII (Telecommunications, Information Market
and Exploitation of Research).
158. For an example of such intervention, see Statement of June 1, 1994 by the
Delegation of the Commission to the Department of State in connection with Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking of January 19, 1994 by the Federal Communications Commission
regarding amendments to FCC rules pertaining to Mobile Satellite Service in certain
frequency bands. In that statement, the E.C. Commission communicated its belief that the
proposed amendments "reflect an approach based on purely domestic U.S. interests" and
"could jeopardize the viable introduction of global satellite personal communications
services." Id.
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reservation systems. The U.S. Department of Transportation and the DG
VII (Transport) have had discussions over the possible protectionist purpose
or effect of such systems.'5 9 Like many others, these discussions have
raised general differences of principle, such as the choice between "national
treatment" and "reciprocity" as the applicable standard of international
comity. On the other hand, the dialogue over computer reservations
systems is not limited to dispute resolution. Much of it is programmatic as
well, and thus represents cooperation as a direct rulemaking strategy, as
discussed in the previous section. More specifically, the Department of
Transportation and DG VIII have taken the dialogue as an opportunity to
discuss the structuring of new regulatory provisions on computer reservations systems. 6 '
v

Public Procurement

When trade-related problems transcend sectoral boundaries or raise very
specific allegations of protectionism, they may require bilateral negotiation
at a political level higher than the individual agency or Commission service.
The government procurement agreements reached between the U.S. and
E.C. in May 1993 and April 1994 exemplify such initiatives. The 1993
public procurement agreement sought to open a combined procurement
market valued at U.S. $200 billion. 6 ' Negotiated between Commissioner
Sir Leon Brittan and U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, the
agreement provided for nondiscrimination and openness in contracts for
public works, goods, and certain services awarded by central administrative
bodies. The agreement became effective on May 25, 1993, for a period of
of a Memorandum of Understanding between the
two years, in the 1form
62
E.C.
the
and
U.S.
The agreement further provided for a jointly financed, but independent,
study of public procurement opportunities between the two sides, as well

159. Conversation with Jonathan Scheele, Head of Division, E.C. Commission, DG VII
(Transport).
160. Letter from Charles Ries, Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs, United States
Mission to the European Communities (Mar. 12, 1995).
161. See Delegation of the European Commission, Office of Press and Public Affairs,
New York, New York, 1993-1994 Calendar.
162. The Memorandum of Understanding was concluded for the Community through
Council Decision 93/323/EEC of May 10, 1993, concerning the conclusion of an Agreement
in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding between the European Economic Community and the United States of America on government procurement, O.J. (L 125) (May 20,
1993). See also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 27TH GENERAL REPORT
supra note 1, at 253; BULL. E.C., vol. 26, No. 4, point 1.3.30 (1993).
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as additional negotiations over "a balanced comprehensive agreement on
procurement."" 3 The negotiations culminated in a further government
procurement agreement of April 13, 1994, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco."6 Although the latter agreement did not resolve all of the remaining
issues (notably government-owned telecommunications issues), it had the
effect of nearly doubling the bidding opportunities available on each
side.' 65 It did so chiefly by permanently covering the electric utility
sector and opening up procurement by subcentral government entities.'66
Whether dialogue over specific claims of protectionism constitutes a
form of regulatory cooperation is ultimately a matter of definition. While
some might place it in a different category, there is good reason to consider
regulatory cooperation and trade negotiations as closely related, rather than
strictly parallel, processes.
c. Regulatory Cooperationin Aid of Mutual Assistance in Enforcement
Commission units and U.S. agencies sometimes undertake regulatory
cooperation to enhance their conduct of routine investigative and enforcement activities. It may be tempting to dismiss the information-sharing and
other forms of cooperation that take place under such agreements as purely
administrative in nature. However, because enforcement decisions are the
way in which regulatory policy is made in many fields, investigative and
enforcement cooperation has a strong regulatory component and performs
many of the same purposes as bilateral cooperation in standard-setting.' 67
Some agencies also have found that, while mutual assistance in enforcement
requires a minimum of substantive regulatory convergence, enforcement
cooperation may in turn give impetus to further cooperation in rulemaking.

163. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 162, art. 5.

164. See

PROGRESS REPORT ON

E.U./U.S.

RELATIONS,

9 (July 1994) (discussing

Morocco procurement agreement between E.U. and U.S.).

165. US.-E.U Procurement Deal Struck, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE EUROPEAN
UNION, LETTER FROM BRUSSELS, vol. 7, no. 2, at 14 (Aug. 10, 1994).
166. PROGRESS REPORT ON E.U./U.S. RELATIONS, supra note 164, at 9.
167. Conversations with Claude Rakovsky (Head of Unit) and Pierre Delsaux
(Administrator), General Policy and International Aspects, DG IV (Competition). See also
Joseph A. Greenwald, Trade and Competition Policy: A New Policy Nexus?, EUROWATCH
(Apr. 17, 1992). In fact, efforts are underway to produce more uniform competition law
rules in the U.S. and E.C. See Looking Ahead: Clinton to Present Trade Policy Initiatives
at US./E.C. Summit, AFX, Jan. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
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Securities and Anti-Trust Enforcement

In September 1991, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the European Commission announced their intention to cooperate in
oversight of the international securities markets. 6 The joint statement
(by then SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden and E.C. Commission VicePresident Sir Leon Brittan) called for a regular dialogue on both policy and
enforcement issues.16 9 More specifically, it contemplated both consultation and an exchange of information between the parties on matters of
common interest, including trends in the securities markets and their
regulation. This understanding has apparently been implemented with some
success.
A similar development is the 1991 agreement between the U.S. and the
Commission government for cooperation in competition law enforcement. 7 Under the agreement, the parties undertook to notify each other
of cases of common interest,"17 to exchange information,1 72 to guarantee
the confidentiality of such information, and to conduct regular consultations.'73 They further agreed to cooperate when dealing with related cases
and, within the limits established by their respective laws, to take account
of the other's important regulatory interests.'74 The agreement is particularly innovative in its adoption of the principle of "positive comity,"
according to which both sides may request the other to take action to stop
anticompetitive activity adversely affecting their business interests. The

168. BULL. E.C., vol. 24, No. 9, point 1.3.32 (1991). See Stan Hinden, Global Pacts
Designedto Fight Stock Fraud, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1991, at C6.
169. At the time, the SEC already had a memorandum of understanding with the U.K.,
France and the Netherlands, but these memoranda more specifically targeted cooperation in
the exercise of investigative powers. US., European CommissionSign CooperationPact,
REUTERS, Sept. 23, 1991, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
170. E.C.-U.S. Agreement on the Application of their Competition Laws, 30 I.L.M. 1487
(1991) [hereinafter CompetitionAgreement]. The agreement was signed in Washington by
Sir Leon Brittan (then Vice-President of the Commission) for the E.C., and William Barr
(then acting U.S. Attorney-General) and Janet Steiger (FTC chair) for the U.S. This
agreement was, of course, the subject of the Court of Justice ruling in France v. Commission. See supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text (discussing implications of Francev.
Commission).
171. Competition Agreement, supra note 170, art. II.
172. Id. art. III.
173. Id. art. VIII.
174. Id. art. IV.
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other side then must consider and, where possible, act favorably on that
request."'7
ii. The Mutual Recognition Agreement
A similar initiative that has not yet reached fruition is the conclusion of
a "mutual recognition agreement" (MRA) between the U.S. and the
E.C.'76 The projected agreement arose out of proposals for the U.S. to
allow non-U.S. entities, and for the E.C. to allow non-E.C. entities, to test
products for conformity assessment purposes with a view toward certifying
them as being in compliance with local health, safety, environmental and
more purely technical requirements. The MRA is expected to be developed
on a general basis, but with industry-specific annexes.'7 7 If achieved, it
will not only ease the enforcement burdens on national enforcement
agencies, but, in accordance with their principal purpose, also promote
bilateral trade in goods.
The MRA negotiations are in some sense an outgrowth of earlier
frictions over access by U.S. producers to E.C. procedures for product
testing and certification-frictions associated with fears of a "fortress
Europe." As part of the 1992 "internal market" program, the E.C. had
become heavily involved, both directly and through existing standards
Fearing loss of
bodies, in the establishment of E.C.-wide standards.'
access to this large and potentially protectionist market, the U.S. pressed the
E.C., on behalf of U.S. business to facilitate the latter's involvement in
setting E.C. standards and in certifying compliance with them.' 79 As a
result of negotiations between then Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher and
Commission Vice-President Bangemann, the Commission in May 1989
agreed to establish procedures for involving U.S. business in these

175. See Joseph Griffin, E.C/U.S. Anti-Trust Co-operation Agreement: Impact on
TransnationalBusiness, 3 ICCLR 114; Allard D. Ham, InternationalCooperation in the
Anti-Trust Fieldand in ParticulartheAgreement between the United States ofAmerica and
the Commission of the European Communities,30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 571, 594 (1993)
(analyzing U.S./E.C. Competition Agreement).
176. See Standards and Testing: What Could Be Final MRA Draft Still Problematicto
Commerce, EUROWATCH, vol. 3, No. 23 (Mar. 6, 1992). For a progress report on MRA
developments, see PROGRESS REPORT ON E.U./U.S. RELATIONS supra note 164, at 11.
177. Id.
178. The chief European standards bodies are CEN (European Committee for Standards)
and CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization). PROGRESS
REPORT ON E.C./U.S. RELATIONS II (July 1993).
179. PROGRESS REPORT ON E.U./U.S. RELATIONS, supra note 164, at 11.
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activities."' The Commission also agreed to enter into discussions over
eventual mutual recognition arrangements on product safety and quality."8 '
While
Negotiations are ongoing, with periodic progress reported.'
formal requests by the U.S. government and U.S. industry for observer
status in European standards bodies largely have been denied, requests for
simple participation in the committee work of those bodies are commonly
granted. In any case, representations to CEN and CENELEC can be made
through the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).'83
2. Commission-Wde Oversight and Coordination of Regulatory
Cooperation
While bilateral regulatory cooperation between the U.S. and the E.C.
tends to develop most effectively at the individual agency or unit level,
both sides have felt the need for some sort of oversight and coordination
mechanism. It is important that the kind of initiatives described in this
report not run at cross-purposes with one another or with more general
"political" orientations at higher levels of government. This section of the
Article deals with the general oversight and coordination functions
performed for the Commission by the Unit for Relations with the USA
(organized within Directorate-General I-External Relations) and by the
U.S.-E.C. "Sub-Cabinet Group." Neither of these units was established
with only regulatory cooperation in mind; their spheres of activity are as
broad as U.S.-E.C. relations generally. Bilateral regulatory cooperation,
however, has emerged as one of their concerns.
a. The Unit for Relations with the USA
Within the Commission's Directorate-General for External Relations (DG
I) is a Directorate B for relations with North America, South Africa,

180.

Id.

181. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
EUROPE Now: A REPORT I (Summer 1989). See also Youri Devuyst, EuropeanCommunity
Integrationand the United States: Toward a New TransatlanticRelationship?, 14 J. EUR.
INTEGRATION 5, 11-12 (1990).
182. E. C.- US. Talks on Standardsand ConformityAssessment,EURECOM, (Commission

of the European Community) vol. 3, no. 7 (July/Aug. 1991) at 2-3. For discussion of
further periodic progress on matters of standardization and conformity assessment, see
PROGRESS REPORT ON E.C./U.S. RELATIONS, supra note 164, at 11 (discussing recent
developments in standardization and conformity assessment).
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Australia and New Zealand. In turn, within that Directorate is a Unit for
Relations with the U.S.A. (U.S.A. Unit), whose function is to oversee and
coordinate relations with the U.S. on all political and economic matters for
which the European Union is competent. While the U.S.A. Unit commonly
deals with the kind of direct international trade issues (e.g., GATT
negotiations, North-South economic relations, anti-dumping, sectoral trade
agreements, export promotion schemes) that lie at the core of DG I's sphere
of responsibility, it has given the notion of political and economic relations
with the U.S. a very broad construction. Because U.S. and E.C. regulation
of economic activity affects bilateral trade (including international economic
efficiency and competitiveness), the U.S.A. Unit considers regulatory
harmonization in all areas to be within its purview. In other words, while
neither DG I nor its U.S. Affairs Unit is primarily responsible for making
sectoral regulatory policy on behalf of the Commission, both have an
interest in the consequences that such policy may have on U.S.-E.C.
economic relations.
The result is that the U.S.A. Unit not only performs the function of
coordinatingand overseeing the steps that the various Commission services
take by way of regulatory cooperation with U.S. agencies within the
political and economic arena in which the E.C. is competent, but also
assumes affirmative responsibility for promoting such steps. The Unit's
principal vehicle for these efforts is its E.U.-U.S. Interservice Group. This
Group gathers representatives from most of the Directorates-General, as
well as from the horizontal Commission services (Secretariat-General, Legal
Service, Statistical Office, Forward Studies Unit), for periodic discussion
of both specific initiatives and overall philosophy
One of the initial undertakings of the E.U.-U.S. Interservice Group was
preparation of a sector-by-sector inventory of issues subject to bilateral
cooperation, whether current or projected." 4 Discussion items have
included the interconnection of telecommunications systems, information
security, regulation of global mobile telecommunications, customs
cooperation, registration of maritime carriers of dangerous goods,
computerized airline reservation systems, licensing of foreign aircraft repair
stations, waste shipment regulation, toxic release regulation, integrated
pollution prevention and control systems, safety and roadworthiness
standards for vehicles, sanitary and phytosanitary regulation, and immigration policy. 85 The E.U.-U.S. Interservice Group basically discusses and
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determines the appropriateness of bilateral regulatory cooperation with U.S.
agencies in these and other specific areas, particularly with a view toward
resolving issues that might otherwise lead to bilateral trade disputes.
Deciding where cooperative efforts are likely to be fruitless is considered
as important as deciding where they are likely to be fruitful.1 6 The E.U.U.S. Interservice Group has performed a periodic "stock-taking" of progress
toward regulatory cooperation between the various services and their U.S.
agency counterparts. '
The resulting documents record, once again
sector-by-sector, the specific meetings that have occurred and the concrete
steps that have been taken.
Given the Group's Commission-wide
membership, this periodic assessment naturally receives wide circulation
and publicity within the Commission.
With regard to regulatory cooperation with the U.S. more generally, the
U.S.A. Unit has issued a "Background Paper on Regulatory Convergence."' 8 The Unit's most salient conclusions are that:
(1) many regulatory divergences result not from protectionist motives,
but as an unintended consequence of measures taken for valid domestic
reasons;
(2) regulatory convergence is more attainable if the polities involved
share common economic and regulatory objectives;
(3) complete regulatory convergence-in the sense of identical
regulation-is ordinarily neither possible nor desirable;
(4) on the other hand, elimination of mutually incompatible regulations
is essential;
(5) regulatory cooperation is desirable irrespective of the specific level
at which it occurs or the intensity of the cooperation;
(6) bilateral regulatory cooperation is compatible with continued
participation in multilateral arrangements;
(7) mutual understanding of administrative systems is essential to the
mutual confidence required for regulatory cooperation;
(8) mutual understanding is also essential to mutual acceptance of the
other's tests and certifications of compliance; and

186. Id.

187. See
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GROUP, E.C.-U.S. DIALOGUE: A STOCKTAKING (Apr. 1994).
188. DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (DG 1), COMMISSION
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EC/US. Relations, U.S. Briefs (Jan. 20, 1993); PROGRESS REPORT ON E.U./U.S.
RELATIONS, supra note 164, at 11.

976

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:933

(9) potential divergences should be identified at as early a stage as
possible so that they may in fact be avoided.8 9
b. The "Sub-CabinetGroup"
To give international regulatory cooperation with the U.S. greater
visibility and support (and to allow resolution of issues that might otherwise
erupt into full-scale trade disputes), the U.S. and the E.C. have placed this
activity in a more politically prominent setting, namely a "Sub-Cabinet
Group" headed, for the E.C., by the Director-General of DG I, currently
Horst Krenzler and, for the U.S., by the Under-Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, currently Joan Spero. The holding of Sub-Cabinet
meetings goes back to the early 1980's, though only under the Bush
Administration were they placed on a regular basis. The first meeting of
the Sub-Cabinet Group during the Clinton Administration took place in
April 1993 in Brussels, followed by a second meeting the following July
in Washington, D.C. These were the first occasions on which international
regulatory cooperation appeared as such on the Sub-Cabinet agenda. 9 '
In February 1994, the U.S.-E.C. Sub-Cabinet Group formally endorsed
bilateral regulatory cooperation. The Sub-Cabinet Group underscored the
importance of regulatory cooperation in reducing regulatory disparities and
facilitating trade, and thus enhancing the transatlantic relationship. To this
end, it specifically advocated greater access to information on the respective
rulemaking processes and a greater use of international standards in
domestic legislation. 9 ' Thereafter, in May 1995, the Sub-Cabinet Group
issued a text on "transatlantic regulatory cooperation," which formalized the
program.92 The text urges U.S. and E.C. authorities to explore ways of
cooperating in their regulatory and enforcement activities, "while still
allowing [them to] meet their legitimate health, safety, consumer protection,
and environmental objectives, and other broadly shared policy goals."' 93
According to the text, such cooperation "can help regulators better address
189. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 188, at 1-3, 6.
190. PROGRESS REPORT ON E.C./U.S. RELATIONS 5 (Dec. 1993).
191. European Commission, Office of Press and Public Affairs, E.U.-U.S. Sub-Cabinet
Meeting of Feb. 2, 1994, Joint Operational Conclusions (Feb. 4, 1994). See also SERVICES
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 1995, REPORT ON U.S. BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT 65 (May 1995).
192. E.U.-U.S. Sub-Cabinet Text on Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation, May 5, 1995,
H. Krenzler and J. Spero signed the text for the European Commission and U.S. Administration, respectively. The full text may be found as an annex to PROGRESS REPORT ON E.U.U.S. RELATIONS, supra note 164.
193. E.U.-U.S. Sub-Cabinet Text, supra note 192.
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their programmatic and enforcement responsibilities, improve relationships
with regulated industries, minimize unnecessary barriers to trade, and
provide better health, safety and environmental data to assist regulatory
decisions."' 94 The forms of cooperation urged include sharing technical
information and infrastructure, consulting in the development of regulations,
early warning of divergent regulatory initiatives (particularly those having
trade implications), and establishing mutual conformity assessment, testing
and certification regimes.'95 The text commits the Sub-Cabinet Group to
enhancing the visibility and credibility of regulatory cooperation by
bringing successful examples of such cooperation to the attention of "the
wider regulatory community."' 96
A series of Progress Reports on E.C.-U.S. Relations published by DG I
in collaboration with other interested DG's and Commission offices reflects
the progress made in the many aspects of U.S.-E.C. relations that fall
within the purview of the Sub-Cabinet Group. 97 At first "regulatory
convergence," and later "regulatory cooperation," figured as rubrics in these
reports, alongside rubrics covering other aspects of the relationship: trade,
investment flows, foreign policy, burden-sharing, "fortress Europe," GATT,
etc. The reports broadly reaffirm the value of bilateral U.S.-E.C. regulatory
cooperation:
Many problems faced by EC or US exporters/investors on each other's market are
not the deliberate result of protectionist inspired legislation but rather the
unintended outcome of measures adopted for valid domestic reasons or of the
differences which exist between the regulatory systems in the EC and the US. ...
The fact that the EC and the US share a fundamentally similar approach to the
question of the market economy and that their citizens and consumers express
similar concerns regarding the quality of products and health and environment
protection, should however, make it feasible to encourage convergence in
regulations and in the legislation on which they are based.
The dialogue set up between the Commission services and the appropriate US
regulatory agencies has helped to increase the knowledge of each others' regulatory
systems and move slowly to an increasing acceptance of the validity of the
motivation behind differing regulations. ...
...[F]urther progress along these lines will depend on the level of commitment
from both the US Administration and the Commission, to identify relevant areas
for future regulation at as early a stage as possible, and to consult and cooperate

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. The first such report (no. 0) appeared in May 1993, followed by reports in July
1993 (no. 1), December 1993 (no. 2), March 1994 (no. 3), July 1994 (no. 4), January 1995
(no. 5), July 1995 (no. 6) and December 1995 (no. 7).
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in drafting legislation on the two sides of the Atlantic which avoids the creation
of additional problems for Transatlantic business.'

At their February 1994 meeting, the U.S. and E.C. representatives agreed
to launch a "pilot" program of bilateral regulatory cooperation. 99 Under
this program, a handful of areas-for example, pesticide regulation, global
mobile satellite telecommunications standards, security systems for
information, and packaging waste-would be selected for close and
monitored regulatory cooperation between the U.S. and European
authorities. It was hoped that, besides teaching some general lessons about
international regulatory cooperation, an examination of the successes and
failures among these initiatives would stimulate further cooperation in still
other areas. Toward the end of 1994, however, it became clear that the
designation of certain sectors as "pilots" for regulatory cooperation
purposes had come to be viewed as problematic, particularly on the U.S.
side. Among the apparent reasons were: (1) an aversion to the publicity
associated with that designation, (2) fear of an attendant loss of autonomy
on the part of the agencies or units primarily involved, and (3) an
unwillingness of agencies to take trade considerations strongly into account
in fulfilling their regulatory objectives. At its September 1994 meeting, the
Sub-Cabinet Group abandoned the idea of a formal set of "pilot" programs
of regulatory cooperation.
Priority instead was given to the development of general principles
governing the practice of U.S.-E.C. regulatory cooperation, including such
"horizontal," or cross-sectoral, issues as access to information in the
respective rulemaking processes and the link between international
standards and internal legislation. This reorientation thus far has resulted
in the above-mentioned formal text on Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation."0 Rather than identify "pilot" sectors in advance, the Sub-Cabinet
Group chose to encourage regulatory cooperation very broadly and to bring
examples, once proven successful, to the attention of the widest possible
regulatory audience.2"'

198. PROGRESS REPORT ON E.C./U.S. RELATIONS 6-7 (May 1993). In a later progress
report, the Commission further remarked that: "[t]he E.U. regards regulatory cooperation as
a dynamic process which, if pursued consistently, will contribute to a build-up of good will
and understanding of mutual concerns and, which, if successful in one sector, will encourage
progress in others." PROGRESS REPORT ON E.C./U.S. RELATIONS 12 (Mar. 1994).
199. European Commission, Office of Press and Public Affairs, E.U.-U.S. Sub-Cabinet
Meeting, Feb. 2, 1994, Joint Operational Conclusions (Feb. 4, 1994). See also PROGRESS
REPORT ON E.U./U.S. RELATIONS 7 (Mar. 1994).
200. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text (discussing text).
201. See supra text accompanying note 196.
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The U.S. Mission to the European Communities in Brussels plays an
important role in preparing and following up on the Sub-Cabinet meetings.
The Mission's work in this respect is headed by the Minister-Counselor for
Economic Affairs.2" 2
Regulatory dialogue between U.S. and E.C.
authorities appears to be a priority for the current U.S. Head of Mission,
with regulatory differences that have generated trade frictions receiving the
greatest attention.
CONCLUSION

An examination of the Commission's policies and practices reveals a
high degree of support for bilateral regulatory cooperation with U.S.
administrative authorities. Up to the present, the decision whether to
engage in some kind of systematic dialogue with U.S. agencies has been
left to the discretion of the individual Commission services. In some
sectors, the dialogue has become heavily institutionalized. Pharmaceutical
regulation is perhaps the best example. There, the participants have
undertaken to establish joint agendas, joint research teams and, to a certain
extent, common standards. In most other sectors, the dialogue is less
comprehensive and less intense. At present, a good deal of regulatory
cooperation is conducted in a trade negotiation climate, that is to say, with
a view toward resolving regulatory differences that have developed into
identifiable trade disputes. With the recent emphasis on "early warning"
efforts, however, regulators on both sides have sought to identify and
resolve, at an early stage, those regulatory differences that have the capacity
to ripen into full-fledged disputes.
Recent "horizontal" developments in the Commission have increased the
likelihood that the U.S.-E.C. dialogue will proceed in a more cooperative
than competitive vein. This is due largely to the development within DG
I of the Unit for Relations with the U.S.A., whose objective it is to
encourage and to monitor agency-level cooperation throughout the services.
At the same time, the Sub-Cabinet Group has given such efforts a high
political profile and a high degree of political support. The 1990
Transatlantic Declaration provides a specific textual basis for both the
agency-level and the horizontal initiatives that I have described.
Considering the relatively short period during which U.S. and E.C.
officials have engaged in deliberate regulatory cooperation, the scale of
activity is impressive and the prospects for expansion are great. The

202. At present, Mr. Charles Ries is Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs, U.S.
Mission to the European Communities.
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pattern however, is extremely uneven. In this conclusion, I explore some
of the reservations that the E.C. may have about launching a more
comprehensive and more intense cooperation with the U.S. agencies. I then
turn to ways in which, whatever its level or intensity, the Commission's
commitment to regulatory cooperation with U.S. agencies might be
increased.
A.

Possible ReservationsAbout US.-E.C. Regulatory Cooperation

1. Do US. Agencies and E.C. Commission Divisions Bring Comparable
PoliticalAuthority to the Dialogue?
Although in many areas the Commission can only propose, rather than
adopt, regulatory action, it nevertheless effectively speaks in international
fora as the E.C.'s executive branch. Moreover, while divided and
subdivided into a large number of separate services, many of which
undertake separate international initiatives, the Commission ultimately
speaks and acts as a "college." U.S. agencies-whether organized in the
executive branch or in independent regulatory agency form-are often
unable to instill the same degree of institutional confidence on the part of
their international interlocutors. Not only are they incapable of binding the
President or the Congress, or even state and local governments, but they
may not be able to bind the large number of other organizationally separate
agencies whose policies affect the issues under discussion. At least some
Commission participants in regulatory cooperation activities with the U.S.
have found the U.S. authorities to be unable to commit themselves to a
regulatory course of action even after joint discussions and study between
the U.S. and E.C. have pointed decisively in that direction."' Moreover,
there seems to be doubt over the commitment of certain U.S. agencies to
the cooperative enterprise-doubt fueled by those agencies' alleged
tendencies to deviate from international standards and to adopt new
regulatory policies on a unilateral basis.
2. Does US.-E.C. CooperationPresent Special LogisticalDifficulties?
On the operational level, E.C. officials engaged in bilateral regulatory
cooperation with U.S. authorities report only modest difficulties. There is
evidently some uncertainty as to which "side" should take the lead on a

203. Conversations with Dr. Alexander Schaub, Deputy Director-General, European
Commission, DG III (Industry), and with Robert Hankin, Deputy Head of Unit, Foodstuffs
Legislation and Scientific and Technical Aspects, European Commission, DG III (Industry).
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given issue or ensure that momentum is maintained. Subject to that
reservation, however, Commission officials report that harmonization has
not been significantly more logistically difficult to achieve with the U.S.,
or with Japan, than among the E.C. Member States themselves." 4 The
consensus, moreover, is that whatever problems are encountered-language
differences, comparability of technical standards, or differences in
regulatory environment, for example 2°'-tend to diminish over time and
with experience.
3. How Do Differing Attitudes Towani Transparency Affect Conduct of
the US.-E.C. Regulatory Dialogue?
Over time, and particularly with the Commission's increased attention to
issues of openness and transparency, what might have been a significant
stumbling block to cooperation has largely been avoided. E.C. regulators
suggest that while E.C. law still imposes fewer procedural strictures on
regulatory policy making than does American law, the disparity has
diminished. More important, the procedural precautions that U.S. law may
impose-precautions that lie beyond the scope of this Article " 6 -are not
generally viewed as incompatible, or even very difficult to square, with
E.C. administrative practice. Nor does transparency appear to be irreconcilable with the effective conduct of international regulatory cooperation." 7

204. Conversation with Patrick Deboyser, Deputy Head of Unit, Pharmaceuticals, DG
III (Industry).
205. According to a leading figure in international pharmaceutical harmonization, "one
of the main impediments to the promotion of mutual acceptance of foreign clinical data is
the differences among ethnic groups and the environments in which they live." Osamu Doi,
Role and Public Health Responsibilitiesofthe Authorities, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION, 18, 24 (Brussels 1991). See also
William C. Steere, Jr., OpeningRemarks,inORLANDO HARMONISATION CONFERENCE, supra

note 129, at 16, 19.
206. See generally George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation with Counterpart
Agencies Abroad: The FAA's Aircraft CertificationExperience, 24 LAW & POLICY IN
INT'L Bus. 669 (1993).
207. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION
Statement by ICH Steering Committee, Tokyo, Oct. 1990, point 5 (Brussels 1991); David
Kessler, Keynote Address, before the Second International Conference on Hamonisation, in
ORLANDO HARMONISATION CONFERENCE, supra note 129, at 22, 27.
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Commission Prescriptionsfor More Effective US.-E.C. Regulatory
Cooperation

Although I have concluded that the prospects for bilateral regulatory
cooperation between the U.S. and E.C. are quite good from a political and
administrative point of view, the process can be improved. The following
are the recommendations that are most commonly advanced in Commission
circles for promoting the process:
1. CoordinationFrom An Early Stage Lessens the Chance That
Regulatory Divergences Will Arise in the First Place
As the Commission's emphasis on "early warning" implies, it is easier
to avoid future regulatory divergences than to eliminate existing ones. To
begin with, the parties are less likely to have taken firm regulatory
positions."' 8 Moreover, it is less likely that one party will find itself
dramatically closer in time than the other to adopting the agreed upon
standards. Sharp differences in rates of progress toward a common goal
can in fact be a cause of friction in international regulatory cooperation
efforts.
2. A Useful Initial Step is to Establish a Complete Inventory of the
Licensing, Testing and Other Regulatory Requirements Prescribed
By Law
E.C. regulators claim to have learned that, if they intend to launch a
broad and lasting program of cooperation with a U.S. agency, rather than
merely defuse a specific regulatory dispute, they should initiate the process
by drawing up an inventory of existing regulatory requirements.' 9 A
comparison may reveal that regulatory differences are not as extensive or
profound as they were thought to be. Even if it reveals substantial
differences, however, a joint inventory affords a useful basis for prioritizing
the convergence efforts that are worth making and for maintaining an
appropriate balance of mutual concessions as convergence proceeds.

208.
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3. Private Industry Can Provide an Enormous Stimulus To
InternationalRegulatory Cooperation
Major actors in the private sector may be well situated to identify the
practical differences in regulatory requirements among regions and to assess
the economic and trade consequences that those differences entail. They
also may be able to support the scientific research, data collection and data
analysis that will provide the raw material for eventually arriving at joint
solutions."' For all these reasons, regulators have found that encouraging
relationships between U.S. and E.C. industry and giving them appropriate
access to government-to-government cooperation is very useful in
promoting the enterprise. While inclusion of industry in the cooperative
enterprise inevitably introduces administrative complications and transparency issues, it is nevertheless decidedly advantageous overall.

210. Elaine C. Esber, The Way Forward: The US. Position, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION, 549, 551 (Brussels 1991).

